The US New Monroe Doctrine's Impact on Latin America: Regional Restructuring and Breakout Under Economic Coercion

Core Fact: The Return of U.S. "Gunboat Diplomacy" in Latin America

At the end of 2025, the United States assembled a rare military force in the Caribbean in recent years: the largest aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines, F-35 fighter jets, and more. The Trump administration not only placed a bounty on Venezuela but also threatened military intervention in Mexico and Colombia, and attempted to seize control of the Panama Canal. This series of actions was dubbed the "Donroe Doctrine" by the New York Post—Trump's version of the "Monroe Doctrine"—and has been formally written into the 2025 National Security Strategy, guiding U.S. diplomacy for the next three years.

This Is Not Just Geopolitics; It Is Economic Coercion

On the surface, this is military deterrence; in essence, it is systematic pressure combining economics and technology. The CIDOB report points out that Trumpism has opened a new era of economic and technological coercion. For Latin America, this means the United States will no longer confine itself to traditional diplomacy, but will directly use military force as a backing to demand concessions from Latin American countries on trade, migration, drugs, and other issues. For example, citing "national security," the United States may renegotiate terms of the USMCA and exert pressure on Chinese investment in Latin America.

Latin America's Forced Response: From Dependency to Diversification

Latin American countries have long maintained a relatively high degree of trade dependency on the United States. The uncertainty of U.S. policy is forcing countries in the region to accelerate their search for alternative markets. China has expanded its presence in Latin America through the Belt and Road Initiative and bilateral agreements, while the EU is also advancing its trade agreement with Mercosur. In 2026, we may see Latin American countries establish new cooperation mechanisms under the framework of the "Global South," such as strengthening linkages between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur.

Industrial Impact: Energy and Critical Minerals Become the Focus of Competition

U.S. hostility toward Venezuela is inseparable from oil interests. At the same time, Latin America holds more than 60% of the world's lithium reserves, as well as large quantities of critical minerals such as copper and iron ore. To secure its new energy supply chains, the United States may increase control over mining investment in Latin America. This brings both opportunities and a higher risk of resource nationalism. Mining countries such as Chile and Peru may face more complex competition.

Diverging Investment Environments: New Directions for Capital Flows

Military threats and sanction risks are prompting some multinational capital to reassess the risk premium on Latin America. On the other hand, global supply chain restructuring is driving "nearshoring," making Mexico a beneficiary of U.S. manufacturing reshoring. Despite strained U.S.-Mexico relations, geographic and economic ties are difficult to sever. Countries with large domestic markets, such as Brazil and Colombia, may shift toward internally driven growth.

Key Observations

• The United States has shifted from "soft power" to "hard deterrence" toward Latin America, normalizing economic coercion.
• Latin America is being forced to become a testing ground for global trade restructuring, with diversification accelerating.
• Critical minerals (lithium, copper) give Latin America new leverage in great-power competition.
• Regional integration has shifted from slogans to real pressure, but internal rifts remain.
• The "crisis opportunity" (polytunity) may belong to countries that adjust flexibly, such as Brazil and Mexico.## Latin America Long-Term Trends Outlook

In the next 5-10 years, the most profound change in Latin America may not be the rise of any one country, but the strengthening of regional autonomy. The United States' new Monroe Doctrine will prompt Latin American countries to adopt more pragmatic diversification strategies in diplomacy, trade, energy, and other areas. The bargaining power of critical minerals may help Latin America upgrade from a "raw material supplier" to a "strategic partner" in global supply chains. However, internal political fragmentation and governance shortcomings remain constraining factors.

Conclusion: Crisis as Opportunity?

In 2026, Latin America will be pushed to the forefront of geopolitical rivalry. Under pressure, regional integration and the diversification of external ties are not a choice but a necessity for survival. Whether the crisis can be turned into "polytunity" (the coexistence of crisis and opportunity) depends on whether Latin American countries have sufficient policy wisdom and unity of will.

(Reference source: CIDOR report "The world in 2026: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/world-2026-ten-issues-will-shape-international-agenda）